Unless he misspoke, he suggested that Ireland intends to effectively double defence spending within the next two years. If he was mistaken, I would have expected the Taoiseach or the Minister for Defence to correct him. They have not done so.
He suggested that in two years, Ireland's defence spending will rise from €1.65b to €3b. That would raise Irish defence spending to 0.54% of GDP - still the second lowest in Europe but off the bottom. Ultimately it needs to reach 0.85%, which is the current average spend of neutrals. That number is increasingly all the time as Austria has passed 1% of GDP and aims to reach 1.2% - funded by special VAT imposed. Switzerland is increasing year by year to reach 1% by 2030. As the others increase the spending the average will increase. Even Malta, currently second from bottom at 0.38%, is finally increasing its defence spending.
That would be a credible achievement. Perhaps the humiliation of realising how inadequate Ireland's defence is when planning for the EU presidency woke up the government to the need to dramatically increase defence spending. In addition, it is worth saying that the previous Minister for Defence, Simon Harris, and the current minister, Helen McEntee, are taking defence seriously - despite having a very demanding brief with Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence. (Eamon Gilmore had Foreign Affairs and Trade and said it was too much for any minister to both together. Leo, ignoring Eamon's advice, insisted in taking Trade into the brief again.)
In both Britain and Ireland, a similar phenomenon has happened. The Minister for Defence or Defence Secretary was highly critical of the chronically inadequate funding given to defence, with the British Defence Secretary resigning over it. Both men, Simon Harris and John Harris, then ended up in the job that had been blocking defence spending - Harris as Minister for Finance, Healy as Chancellor of the Exchequer.
I will certainly applaud the government if they bring Irish defence spending to 0.54% of GDP. However that has to be just a step on the road, and not an end point. Ireland needs to have a properly funded, staffed and equipped Defence Forces with 11,000 serving in it, a navy of 12 ships including frigates and not just patrol boats, enough personnel to reverse the steep decline in patrol days, and to have the proper number of ships to patrol our EEZ, with each ship double-crewed. The air force (as the air corps is being renamed in a new bill. Most countries dropped the old name 'air corps' a century ago. The US replaced the Army Air Corps by the Army Air Force in 1941 and in 1947 a new United States Air Force (USAF) was created.) needs to reverse the decision in the 1990s and create a proper military using jet fighters. It has been nuts expecting the Air Corps to police both the Irish sovereign air space and Irish-controlled space without jet fighters when the planes entering it are jet-propelled. It is like expecting the Gardaí on bicycles to chase criminals on motorways.
Martin as a dithering Defence Minister was opposed to having an air force with an intercept capability, being content to let the RAF do it (despite the RAF having a severe lack of planes itself). Harris quickly realised that Ireland needed to have a proper squadron of jet fighters to do the standard air defence done in all neutrals but Malta.
Add to that a new bill will fundamentally reorganise the Defence Forces - with the air corps being replaced by an air force, the naval service replaced a proper navy, and the three elements, army, navy and air force each with their own head, over which there will be a Chief of Defence replacing the Chief of Staff.
The result will give the defence forces a proper modern structure and not one stuck in the mid-twentieth century.
No doubt some people with their usual paranoia will conclude that this is all about joining NATO. Neither Ireland, not Austria, nor Switzerland, nor Malta have any intention of joining NATO. Nor is NATO wanting them to join. Of the neutrals, only Cyprus wants to join NATO, but it is likely to be blocked by its old enemy Turkey. Turkey invaded Cyprus in the 1970s and occupied the north of the island, setting up an internationally unrecognised state there.
Countries joining NATO have to accept international borders. For Turkey, recognising Cyprus's de-jure ownership of the island would probably be unacceptable to Turkey. Accepting Cypriot membership would delegitimise its already illegitimate state on the island.
The issue of borders is why ultimately Ireland decided not to join NATO in 1949. Recognising international borders would have meant Ireland accepting partition on the island, and that Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom. Ireland had been on the brink of joining, and then External Affairs minister Sean MacBride told both the Dáil and the Seanad that Ireland fully supported the creation of NATO and its aims and made it clear that Ireland was not neutral in the rivalry between the communist world and the West. He made it clear that Ireland was on the side of the West.
Yet, in 1955, when Ireland finally joined the UN (Stalin had repeatedly vetoed it, but he was now dead) as it all UN members it accepted all existing international borders, including partition.
The reason Ireland is increasing its military spending and re-organisation of its Defence Forces is to reach the standard of other neutrals.
That said, Ireland, Austria, Switzerland and Malta issue on caveat on NATO. Absolutely none of them have any intention now or in the future of joining NATO. However unknown events outside their control, or NATO's, may force them to make a decision they do not want to make.
If one had asked Sweden or Finland up to the 24th February 2022 whether they would ever join NATO the answer would have been clear. "Absolutely not." That remained the case even though Putin made aggressive threats against both. Sweden was flabbergasted why he was targeting them. They had never fought a war in two hundred years. They had been neutral all that time. Putin's bizarre fixation on Sweden seemed to be linked to the fact that his hero, Peter the Great, had fought repeated wars against Sweden. But the days of Sweden as a major military power with an empire were centuries gone.
Finland declared its independence from Russia with the fall of the Tsars. The Soviet Union had invaded Finland twice, and taken part of its territory, but it was flabbergasted that after a hundred years of independence Putin seemed to be questioning Finland's right to exist.
Both countries treated Putin's threats and his 'Russkiy Mir' vision as just posing to win the support of Nationalists, but which he had no intention of acting on. Experts all over believed that - until 24th February 2022, when he did carry out one of his threats and invaded Ukraine.
That stunned and worried both Sweden and Finland, plus the Baltic states, and Poland (attacked by Russia 19 times in its history). Sweden and Finland were so concerned that they did the unthinkable. They decided to join NATO for protection. Public opinion swung from opposing joining NATO to demanding they join NATO faster than political opinion.
The one concern for Ireland, Austria, Switzerland and Malta is that specific threats against them by Putin could force them to do the one thing they didn't want to do, and join NATO for their own protection as they could not protect themselves.
In reality, only two of the four are under any risk: Austria and Ireland. Malta is tiny (eight times the size of the Aran Islands) and geographically irrelevant. Switzerland is as always protected by its geography with its mountains.
Putin's 'Russkiy Mir' (Russian world) has as one of its basics something he put this way: 'If Russian soldiers were ever on your territory, you belong to us and we are taking you back.' Unfortunately, Soviet Red Army soldiers occupied eastern Austria from 1945 to 1955 following World War II. That means that he could claim Austria according to his own warped logic. Some years ago the then Austrian Foreign Minister unilaterally proposed that Austria join NATO. The reaction was overwhelmingly "absolutely not." However Austria was shaken by the aggressive threatening Russian response that stressed the Soviet Union's presence in Austria and implied that because of that it had the 'right' to intervene. Its tone was "You are ours."
As a neutral, unlike Ireland and Malta, Austria is well protected. Its military 16,000 to 22,000 active-duty personnel and roughly 125,600 reservists. Austria requires all able-bodied male citizens to complete mandatory military or civilian service upon turning 18. The fear is though that Austria may face more Russian threats and bullying. Its doesn't want to left exposed as Ukraine was when Merkel with crass stupidity blocked Ukraine joining NATO.
The reaction is Austria is unambiguously "we have no intention of joining NATO. None whatsoever." Leaders however say "but threats by Putin may leave us with no choice."
Luckily, Russian soldiers never set foot in Ireland so it isn't covered by Russkiy Mir. Its problem is geography. We have created a world in the West entirely dependent on connectivity. That connectivity depends on data cables. They are Europe's and NATO's biggest weakness. Seventy-five percent of data cables every bank, every business, every citizen, every hospital, everyone, depends on are located in and beside Ireland's Exclusive Economic Zone, in the Celtic Sea.
Ireland militarily could never defend them even with a full strength military. We asked NATO to police them, with we aiding them. Russia has made it absolutely clear that they are arguably one of its top three targets if a war starts. Russia's spy ship the Yantar has repeatedly surveyed them for attack points. The Russian navy has repeatedly appeared around them. A Russian nuclear submarine, possibly carrying nuclear weapons, based itself in Cork harbour. We have no sonar (though some is due to arrive next year) so we had to rely on the Royal Navy to inform us on the presence of the sub, and then we had ask it to drive it out of Cork harbour.
Another Russian target is to destabilise the EU. One way it tried was to encourage illegal arrivals of migrants along European borders to create a public backlash. Ireland is a net contributor to the EU budget, while, along with Malta being the least protected country. It is exceptionally vulnerable in terms of electricity supply. It depends for gas for its gas-powered electricity generation on three interconnectors in the Irish Sea. Those interconnectors have been repeatedly targeted by the Yantar. On one occasion the government had to get specialists to check the interconnectors amid fears the Yantar has planted explosives. No explosives were found but that may be because its mission was interrupted when the Royal Norwegian Navy alerted Ireland to the Yantar's presence and that it was sending down underwater drones to the interconnectors.
Ireland did a detailed study as to what the effects would be if the interconnectors were damaged. Russia had damaged interconnectors and cables elsewhere. The result of the study, named Operation Cathal, were stark. It would take six months to repair the interconnectors. Ireland's gas-powered electricity generation accounts for 48% minimum of Ireland's electricity. Ireland would face six months of rolling blackouts all over the state. Major employers who use lots of electricity would be cut off for the period to give priority to electricity supplies to homes, hospitals, etc. The economic cost, including loss of taxes, would be colossal. Vast numbers of jobs would be lost.
Ireland because of its weak defence is exceptionally exposed and vulnerable.
Ireland has been targeted for cyber-attacks. Russia attempted to build a major spy communication headquarters at its Dublin embassy. Russia legally owns the land the embassy is on, but not the area underground. The Irish government banned it from building it. Satellite images suggest that Russia may well have built it anyway.
Ireland's location is problematic for another reason. The 500-mile stretch of ocean between Iceland and Scotland forms a crucial part of the GIUK Gap (Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom), a premier strategic naval chokepoint. Russia has on a number of occasions had submarines based just off the Donegal coast for use in hostile actions in the GUIG gap. Again, Ireland's weak defence leaves an opening that Russia exploits.
Russia increasingly sends its so-called 'shadow fleet' through Ireland's EEZ. That is problematic in a host of ways. Many of the ships are barely seaworthy. They fly false flags, claiming the ship is registered in, and has been verified as seaworthy in, the country whose flag is flying. In reality that country has nothing to do with that ship and has never inspected it for seaworthiness.
Countries have a right to board ships in its EEZ and verify that its cargo is legal and all the required documents are possessed. Neither is the case with the shadow fleet. Nigeria finds its flag is regularly flown by the ships despite it having nothing to do with it, the ship not being registered there and never having been inspected for it.
Quite apart from the contraband cargo, the appalling state of the ships is a very real threat to Ireland. Should one sink, they would devastate Irish fishing grounds and the west coast of Ireland with oil, yet the ships are not insured, and in such a poor state that when one is seized by a state the owner never claims it, as it is not worth the effort.
Again, Ireland's inadequate defence means Russia knows it can use Irish waters for its unsafe unseaworthy ships carrying contraband.
Ireland's security has been repeatedly targeted by Russia. Between 2017 and 2020 Tupolev TU–95 bombers, nicknamed 'bear bombers', repeatedly entered Irish-controlled airspace - on one case they repeatedly entered Irish-controlled airspace each day for a number of days.
They did not enter Irish sovereign airspace. Irish-controlled airspace is a larger airspace than sovereign airspace. The Irish Aviation Authority has responsibility for monitoring and policing a much larger area than sovereign airspace.
The repeated entry of the planes was suspected of being an effort to test RAF reaction times in preparation for any war as Ireland has to ask the RAF to police its skies as it cannot itself. The behaviour of the Russian planes was deeply dangerous and irresponsible, especially when they turn off their transponders, making them effectively invisible to civil aviation surveillance systems.
Recklessness in the skies has long been a Putin hallmark. One place Russia no longer flies planes over is Turkey, as after repeat incursions the Turkish president told Putin that Turkey will shoot down every Russian military plane in Turkish airspace.
Russia has often used the Tupolev TU–95 bombers in other countries' non-sovereign airspaces as much for intimidation as anything else. However Ukraine has dealt Russia a significant blow by destroying a number of the seventy year old bombers. They are literally irreplaceable. The factory that made them closed in the 1960s and the designers are long dead, plus they require parts no longer available. Ukraine didn't have to destroy the planes, but just have a drone damage one part of the fuselage. Once that tiny spot was damaged the plane would never be stable enough to fly and that spot could never be repaired.
Earlier this month it was revealed that Ukraine had destroyed two Tupolev TU–95s. Putin considered his prized planes, a key part of the country's nuclear triad—safe at the Engels-2 airbase because it is so deep inside Russian territory. Ukraine reached them anyway, and they were not the first ones it destroyed. Putin had to move them again even further from Ukraine and hope Ukraine cannot destroy any more.
From flying Tupolev TU–95s in Irish airspace to repeatedly entering Irish waters with nuclear-powered submarines that usually carry nuclear weapons, including having one in Cork harbour, off the east coast and off the Donegal coast, having the Yantar spy ship repeatedly behaving suspiciously over Ireland's interconnectors and over the data cables, apparently building their underground spy communication centre at their embassy (despite being told not to by the Irish government), and repeated cyber-attacks, notably against the HSE, Russia is clearly very interested in focusing on Ireland - partly because of its highly sensitive location, particularly because of its chronically adequate defence that earned the waters around Ireland the nickname "the wild west!"
None of what has happened is remotely likely to lead the Irish government to change its mind and join NATO. Ireland and Austria are still rock solid in ruling out joining NATO. Both however have the unspoken fear that Russia may in the future go too far in its behaviour and leave both states reaching the same point Sweden and Finland and conclude "we don't want to join NATO but we need to. We are too exposed without it."
By the way it is worth nailing two myths that are inevitably repeated when the issue of NATO comes out - though I hope it doesn't.
1. The oft repeated claim that 'neutrals are safe. Countries don't attack neutrals.'
The myth comes from the Second Hague Convention Hague (Titloe V: Convention on the rights of neutral powers and persons (1907), including the inviolability of the territory of neutral powers). To give an idea of the states participating, here is the list of heads named:
His Majesty the German Emperor, King of Prussia; the President of the United States of America; the President of the Argentine Republic; His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia, &c., and Apostolic King of Hungary; His Majesty the King of the Belgians; the President of the Republic of Bolivia; the President of the Republic of the United States of Brazil; His Royal Highness the Prince of Bulgaria; the President of the Republic of Chile; His Majesty the Emperor of China; the President of the Republic of Colombia ; the Provisional Governor of the Republic of Cuba; His Majesty the King of Denmark; the President of the Dominican Republic; the President of the Republic of Ecuador; His Majesty the King of Spain; the President of the French Republic; His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India; His Majesty the King of the Hellenes; the President of the Republic of Guatemala; the President of the Republic of Haiti; His Majesty the King of Italy; His Majesty the Emperor of Japan; His Royal Highness the Grand Duke of Luxemburg, Duke of Nassau; the President of the United States of Mexico; His Royal Highness the Prince of Montenegro; the President of the Republic of Nicaragua; His Majesty the King of Norway; the President of the Republic of Panama; the President of the Republic of Paraguay; Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands; the President of the Republic of Peru; His Imperial Majesty the Shah of Persia; His Majesty the King of Portugal and of the Algarves, &c.; His Majesty the King of Roumania; His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias; the President of the Republic of Salvador; His Majesty the King of Servia; His Majesty the King of Siam; His Majesty the King of Sweden; the Swiss Federal Council; His Majesty the Emperor of the Ottomans; the President of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay; the President of the United States of Venezuela.
Article 1 states "The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable."
On paper, or rather parchment, that seems straightforward. But there is a rather big problem. The negotiations started in 1904, signed in 1907, came into force in 1910 . . . and was broken on the 2nd of August 1914, when the country whose head of state, the German Emperor, was top of the list, invaded a neutral. In invading Luxembourg Germany broke the convention.
Two days later, Germany invaded another neutral, Belgium.
It was brazen. When the German plenipotentiary, Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, the German ambassador to Constantinople, signed the text he may not have known that Germany already had plans to invade neutrals. That is not the case with another German delegate, Major General von Gündell of the General Staff. He certainty knew that a year earlier Germany had adopted the Schlieffen Plan - with the commitment to invade Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands. (A rewrite by Alfred von Schlieffen's successor, Helmuth von Moltke the Younger, changed the plan to drop the need to invade the Netherlands.)
So Germany signed the Second Hague Convention Title V already knowing that in any major European war, Germany intended to break it.
Those first two breaks were just the tip of the iceberg. In World War II, Nazi Germany invaded neutrals Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway. It would have invaded neutral Sweden except that Sweden broke the convention by actively aiding Nazi Germany, breaking Article 5. Neutral Finland was invaded twice by the Soviet Union, in 1939 and 1941.
Nor has countries breaking title V on neutrality ceased in the 20th century. Russia broke it in 2014 in invading Ukraine and taking Crimea - despite Ukraine at the time being neutral constitutionally. Modern Russia is bound by it as the successor state of the USSR, which was bound by it as a successor state of Russia under the tsars who originally signed it.
Ukraine signed and ratified the conventions in 2015, but it arguably was already bound as a successor state to the USSR. Its legal advice was that it was covered by it since the Russian plenipotentiary Baron Aleksandr Nelidow signed it on behalf of the Russian empire that included Ukraine. Nevertheless it signed up again in 2015.
As a result, for all the impressive words in Article 1, the Second Hague Convention's Title V on the protection of neutrals is worthless. It is nothing more than a gentleman's agreement that was broken within four years of coming into force and as been repeatedly broken.
Ireland does not appear to be a signatory to title V, on neutrality or indeed any of the titles other than Title I: the Convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes.
Of course it could be argued that Ireland is the successor state of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. That state signed Title V on 18-10-1907 but according to the official website never ratified it.
Only 36 countries have ever signed Title V. That may be because by the mid 1940s it had been repeatedly broken so thoroughly that all the neutrals invaded bar Finland (and uninvaded Sweden) were founding members of NATO. They both joined NATO in the 2020s after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022.
Its powerless can be seen in the fact that countries have the right to withdraw from it. Yet no country planning to invade a neutral ever withdrew from it. There was no point as they could break it with impunity.
So being a neutral does not make a country safe. If a country wants to attack a country they can - not withstanding title V of the convention.
By the way, for clarity the supposed protection only applies to neutrals who are signatories, and only supposedly protects those neutrals from attacks from belligerents who are signatories.
Another oft repeated myth is joining NATO would bring in conscription. In fact, only 29% of NATO members have conscription or national service. It is entirely a matter for each state, not NATO, whether they have it. Statistically it it is neutrals, not NATO members, that have conscription or national service, with 60% of neutrals having it.
I don't expect Ireland or Austria to join NATO unless Putin makes unexpected aggressive threats to them that they feel they need the collective protection of NATO membership. Given the reckless threatening behaviour of Putin, you can never anything out in a world dominated by madmen like Putin and Trump.
